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FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF 
TEACHER INSTRUCTIONAL SPEECH 
WALTER E. KUHN 
INTRODUCTION 
Rarely is a constitutional controversy exemplified by a 
Hollywood actor and industrial hemp. Actor Woody Harrelson, of 
“Cheers” and “White Men Can’t Jump” fame, visited tenured 
Kentucky fifth-grade teacher Donna Cockrel and her class on two 
occasions in 1996 and 1997 to discuss industrial hemp with the 
students.1 He had prior official approval for the visits2 and brought 
along an “entourage, including representatives of the Kentucky 
Hemp Museum and Kentucky Hemp Growers Cooperative 
Association, several hemp growers from foreign countries, CNN, and 
various Kentucky news media representatives.”3 The actor “spoke 
with the children about his opposition to marijuana use, yet he 
distinguished marijuana from industrial hemp, and advocated the use 
of industrial hemp as an alternative to increased logging.”4 He also 
showed the class products made from hemp and hemp seeds, a 
banned substance in Kentucky.5 In July 1997, after the second visit 
and an uncustomary review of her teaching methods,6 Ms. Cockrel 
 
Copyright © 2006 by Walter E. Kuhn. 
 1. Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1042–43 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 2. Id. The principal claimed that “he was only told that the presentation to be given was 
about agriculture,” before the first visit. After that visit, the superintendent “adopted a new 
visitors policy for ‘controversial’ topics” and told Ms. Cockrel that “it would not be in her best 
interests if Harrelson made any more visits to her class.” In the end, though, Ms. Cockrel 
followed the visitors policy and each visit was approved. Id. 
 3. Id. at 1042. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 1042–43. 
 6. See id. at 1044 (explaining that Ms. Cockrel was the only tenured teacher at her school 
to be evaluated after two years instead of the customary three). 
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was terminated by the school district, allegedly over concerns about 
her teacher performance.7 On June 4, 1998, Ms. Cockrel filed suit in 
federal district court, claiming that she was terminated in retaliation 
for exercising her First Amendment right to free speech by inviting 
Mr. Harrelson to make a presentation about industrial hemp to her 
class.8 
Although Ms. Cockrel ultimately prevailed when the Sixth 
Circuit reversed the district court and held her speech was 
constitutionally protected,9 difficult issues remain. This odd set of 
facts raises a number of important questions. For example, how 
should the courts balance the right of teachers to speak freely as 
individuals with the right of schools to control their message to 
students? Who controls, and who should control, curricula 
development? To what extent should schools be allowed to 
homogenize, and teachers be allowed to personalize, curricula? How 
should the law arrive at the correct balance between exposing 
students to a diversity of ideas to stimulate independent thought, and 
impressing upon students lasting societal values? The stakes are high, 
as the answers to these questions implicate everything from the civil 
liberties of individual citizens in their roles as governmental 
functionaries, to the homogeneity of the government’s message to 
students and democracy’s need for young people to develop the 
ability to thing independently and follow societal norms. 
This Note argues that the current tests for deciding cases 
involving First Amendment protection of teacher instructional speech 
are inappropriate, and that a hybrid test should be adopted. Part I 
discusses background issues and introduces the two precedents 
currently used to decide instructional speech cases, Hazelwood and 
Pickering. Part II describes the evolution of the Pickering test and 
analyzes its benefits and shortcomings. Part III similarly evaluates the 
Hazelwood test. Finally, Part IV advocates the use of a hybrid test to 
decide future instructional speech cases and explores the possible 
outcomes of such a test. This Note concludes that a hybrid test would 
 
 7. See id. at 1045 (indicating that Ms. Cockrel was terminated for deficient 
“communication with parents regarding student performance and teacher expectations; 
documentation of lesson plans; showing ‘consistent sensitivity to individual academic, physical, 
social, and cultural differences and respond[ing] to all students in a caring manner;’ and acting 
in accordance with laws and with school regulations and procedures”). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 1055. 
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expand teacher freedom in the classroom by applying different 
standards for content and process restrictions of instructional speech. 
I.  PRELIMINARY ISSUES 
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that public 
school teachers have First Amendment rights within the confines of 
the schoolhouse, it has never specifically addressed the degree of 
protection that the First Amendment provides for in-class 
instructional speech.10 The protection of in-class speech implicates at 
least two competing interests: a teacher’s right to expression under 
the First Amendment and a school system’s right to set its curriculum 
and restrict the speech of its employees.11 While teachers do not “shed 
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate,”12 nor does the state discard its interest in 
safeguarding its message by regulating the speech of its employees.13 
Further complicating the issue is the Supreme Court’s conception 
of the goals of the public school system. At times, the Court has 
suggested that education demands open-mindedness and expression 
of multiple opinions,14 but at others it has indicated that primary and 
secondary schools play a unique role in inculcating fundamental 
societal values.15 The competing and sometimes conflicting aims of the 
 
 10. Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001); Kara 
Lynn Grice, Note, Striking an Unequal Balance: The Fourth Circuit Holds that Public School 
Teachers Do Not Have First Amendment Rights to Set Curricula in Boring v. Buncombe County 
Board of Education, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1960, 1960 (1999); Jacinto Zavala, Comment, Teachers 
Beware! You May Be Liable Under Proposition 227: California Teachers Association v. State 
Board of Education, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 493, 499 (2003). 
 11. Grice, supra note 10, at 1960. 
 12. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 13. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) 
(stating that when a school speaks through its employees, it can “regulate the content of what is 
or is not expressed”). 
 14. Gregory A. Clarick, Note, Public School Teachers and the First Amendment: Protecting 
the Right to Teach, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 718–19 (1990) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969), and W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 637 (1943)). 
 15. The Supreme Court in Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), held of 
the importance of such a role:  
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to 
books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example the shared 
values of a civilized social order. Consciously or otherwise, teachers—and indeed the 
older students—demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and political 
expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of class.  
Id. at 683; see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–80 (1979). 
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educational system are to expose students to a broad variety of ideas 
and “develop inquisitive minds and independent thought” by 
promoting tolerance of unpopular and controversial views, and 
provide “intellectual and moral guidance” by endorsing community 
values necessary to the maintenance of a democracy.16 The first goal 
cannot be accomplished without giving teachers a measure of free 
expression and academic freedom, while the second justifies 
limitations on teachers’ classroom expression.17 
This Part outlines the competing interests implicated by 
instructional speech cases. First, Subpart A analyzes teachers’ 
interests in freedom of expression as citizens and academics. Second, 
Subpart B examines the state’s interest as an employer in regulating 
the speech of its employees. Third, Subpart C considers students’ 
interest in being exposed to a variety of viewpoints. Finally, Subpart 
D briefly introduces the two cases currently used to decide 
instructional speech cases. 
A. Teachers’ Interests in Free Expression and Academic Freedom 
To effectuate the goal of introducing students to a broad 
spectrum of ideas, courts have recognized some constitutional 
academic freedom protections within the classroom, at least for 
college and university professors.18 Teachers enjoy two legally 
protected types of academic freedom. First, they have the substantive 
right to choose a teaching method that serves a demonstrated 
educational purpose. Second, courts acknowledge a procedural right 
to not be discharged for using a teaching method that was not 
proscribed by a regulation, or for which, if forbidden, there was not 
adequate notice given of the restriction.19 
 
 16. Krizek v. Bd. of Educ., 713 F. Supp. 1131, 1137 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Grice, supra note 10, at 
1995. 
 17. Grice, supra note 10, at 1995. 
 18. E.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“Our 
Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value 
to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is . . . a special concern of 
the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the 
classroom.”); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (D. Mass. 1971) (“[A] public school 
teacher has not only a civic right to freedom of speech both outside and inside the schoolhouse, 
but also some measure of academic freedom as to his in-classroom teaching.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 19. Mailloux, 323 F. Supp. at 1390. 
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Despite the judicial recognition of academic freedom, though, 
the idea has not been extended beyond colleges and universities to 
secondary and elementary schools, and there is some question as to 
whether the doctrine extends beyond normal First Amendment free 
speech rights. The courts’ reluctance to expand academic freedom 
rights to secondary and elementary school teachers results from the 
age and maturity of the students involved and the aforementioned 
dueling purposes of public schools to expose students to various ideas 
while inculcating them with societal values.20 Colleges and 
universities, on the other hand, can focus exclusively on the former 
goal because of the relative maturity of their student audience. At 
least one court has held, however, that to the extent that there are 
any academic freedom rights beyond normal First Amendment 
freedom of speech, that right adheres to the college or university as a 
whole, rather than individual professors.21 The Fourth Circuit held 
that academic freedom is a professional norm, not a legal right, and 
there is no right to academic freedom that extends beyond protection 
against dismissal for the exercise of one’s First Amendment rights.22 
Under this holding, the two types of recognized academic freedom 
are imbedded in normal First Amendment rights, not a special right 
to academic freedom.23 In support, the court notes that the Supreme 
Court has never set aside a state regulation on the ground that it 
infringed upon the First Amendment right to academic freedom.24 
Because most courts do not recognize a separate constitutional right 
to academic freedom, this Note will focus exclusively on the 
protection of instructional teacher speech by the more general First 
Amendment freedom of speech that all citizens enjoy. 
B. Schools’ Interests in Regulating Speech as Public Employers 
A school system’s interest in restricting its employees’ speech 
differs significantly from the state’s interest in regulating the speech 
 
 20. Grice, supra note 10, at 1995. 
 21. E.g., Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Our review of the law, 
however, leads us to conclude that to the extent the Constitution recognizes any right of 
‘academic freedom’ above and beyond the First Amendment rights to which every citizen is 
entitled, the right inheres in the University, not in individual professors . . . .”). 
 22. Id. at 411. 
 23. See id. at 412 (explaining that, to the extent the Supreme Court has recognized a right 
of academic freedom at all, it is an institutional right to self-governance in academic affairs, and 
thus not a right of the individual professor). 
 24. Id. 
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of ordinary citizens.25 The government can regulate the content of 
expression when it is the speaker and when it enlists private entities 
to communicate its message.26 That is, when the government 
appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own, it 
is entitled to say what it wishes, and when the government assigns 
public money to private entities to transmit its message, it “may take 
legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither 
garbled nor distorted.”27 In the classroom context, this means that 
when the government funds speech with the goal of promoting a 
diversity of viewpoints (rather than the government’s own view), it 
cannot restrict that speech.28 The question, of course, is to what 
degree the government can restrict speech when it is paying teachers 
to both transmit its own message and to expose students to various 
viewpoints. 
C. Protecting Students’ Right to Hear 
The primary justification for recognizing protection of teachers’ 
instructional speech is to defend the interest of the teacher in 
speaking on societal issues and/or influencing the curriculum. At least 
one federal court has suggested, however, that students’ right to hear 
may serve as a basis for protecting teachers’ right to speak.29 Under 
that theory, safeguarding teacher instructional speech is mainly for 
the benefit of the students and community.30 This intersects with the 
goal of the public school system to expose students to various ideas in 
an effort to foster intellectual curiosity and independent thought. 
Regulating teacher speech, the argument goes, deprives students of 
the diversity of views necessary to further their intellectual 
development and leaves them unprepared for the unfiltered 
cacophony of ideas outside the schoolyard. 
 
 25. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) 
(recognizing that “when the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices”); Victor v. 
McElveen, 150 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The government has legitimate interests in 
regulating the speech of its employees, however, that differ significantly from its interests in 
regulating the speech of people generally.”). 
 26. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. 
 27. Id. (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196–200 (1991)). 
 28. See id. at 834 (“It does not follow . . . that viewpoint-based restrictions are proper when 
the University does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead 
expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.”). 
 29. Krizek v. Bd. of Educ., 713 F. Supp. 1131, 1137 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
 30. Id. 
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D. The Two Tests: Pickering and Hazelwood 
Because the Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the 
matter of First Amendment protection for teachers’ in-class speech, 
lower courts generally use one of two tests developed by the Court in 
other contexts:31 Pickering v. Board of Education,32 and Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier.33 Discussed in greater detail in Parts II 
and III, respectively, the facts of Pickering have to do with out-of-
class speech by a teacher to a much broader audience than students,34 
while Hazelwood deals with student speech.35 The use of the tests set 
forth in Pickering and Hazelwood demonstrates the difficulty of 
deciding instructional teacher speech cases without a clear Supreme 
Court precedent. Neither fact pattern is an ideal starting point for 
espousing a test to decide whether in-class speech by public school 
teachers is protected by the First Amendment. 
II.  THE PICKERING TEST 
Although Hazelwood has become the dominant test for 
instructional speech cases, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have both 
used the Pickering test of whether the speech in question involves a 
matter of public concern.36 First, in Pickering v. Board of Education a 
public school teacher was fired for sending a letter to a local 
newspaper critical of the way the school board and superintendent 
had handled past proposals to raise new revenue.37 The Court used 
the test of whether the teacher’s speech was made as a citizen 
commenting on matters of public concern, as opposed to as an 
employee speaking on matters of private concern, to decide whether 
the letter in question was protected by the First Amendment.38 Once 
 
 31. Grice, supra note 10, at 1975; Zavala, supra note 10, at 499. 
 32. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 33. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 34. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564–65. 
 35. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260. 
 36. Gary Young, Teaching English in English: It’s the Law, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 24, 2001, at 
B6, available at http://onenation.org/0109/092401.htm. 
 37. Id. at 564–65. 
 38. See id. at 568 (stating that public school teachers may not be constitutionally compelled 
to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise have as citizens to speak on 
matters of public concern); Grice, supra note 10, at 1975–76 (“[Courts applying Pickering] have 
determined that when a teacher—a government employee—is speaking as a citizen on a matter 
of public concern, her speech is protected under the First Amendment, but when she is speaking 
as a government employee about her own personal interest, her speech is not protected.” 
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it decided that the speech was on a matter of public concern, the 
Court balanced the interest of the teacher in making the statement 
against the interest of the government as an employer in promoting 
the efficiency of the public services it provided.39 Ultimately, the 
Court held that there was no legal basis for the teacher’s dismissal 
because the speech regarded a matter of public concern, the teacher’s 
interest in making the statement outweighed the state’s interest in 
restricting it, and the comment was not reckless or knowingly false.40 
Under the Pickering test, if a teacher’s speech is not on a matter 
of public concern, a school can constitutionally regulate it.41 If the 
speech involves a matter of public concern, however, the court uses a 
balancing test to decide whether the school’s interest as an employer 
in workplace efficiency and lack of disruption outweighs the teacher’s 
interest in expression.42 The Pickering test aims to recognize the 
enhanced interest of schools in regulating the speech of their 
employees while not allowing administrators to compel teachers “to 
relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as 
citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection with 
the operation of the public schools in which they work.”43 
A. Rationale for Applying the Pickering Test 
Pickering protects the right to comment on matters of public 
concern because doing so is “‘more than self-expression; it is the 
 
(footnotes omitted)); Zavala, supra note 10, at 500 (“Under Pickering, a public employee’s 
speech effectively ‘receives no First Amendment protection unless it involves a matter of public 
concern.’” (quoting Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1149 n.6 (9th Cir. 
2001))). But see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (“We do not suggest, however, that 
[plaintiff’s] speech, even if not touching upon a matter of public concern, is totally beyond the 
protection of the First Amendment.”). 
 39. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568–69 (“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance 
between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern 
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs through its employees.”); Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 777 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(“Pickering established a test that first asks whether a public employee’s expression addresses a 
matter of public concern and then balances that employee’s interest in making the statement 
with the interests of the government in ‘promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs.’” (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568)). 
 40. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. 
 41. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  
 42. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.  
 43. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; see also Clarick, supra note 14, at 699 (comparing the 
school’s interests as an employer with the teacher’s interests as a citizen). 
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essence of self-government.’”44 The right to lend one’s voice to the 
debate on public issues is fundamental to democracy.45 The courts 
that use the Pickering analysis recognize this weighty interest and 
hold that a public employees do not have to relinquish their First 
Amendment rights to comment on matters of public concern by 
virtue of government employment.46 
Competing with the citizen-teacher’s right to speak on matters of 
public concern is the school’s interest in ensuring workplace 
efficiency as well as employee discipline and harmony.47 Under 
Pickering, this employer interest outweighs teachers’ interests in free 
expression when the speech does not involve a matter of public 
concern, and the school can thus regulate the speech.48 When teacher 
speech implicates the significant First Amendment interest of 
commenting on a matter of public concern, the school’s interest as an 
employer does not disappear, but must be balanced against the 
teacher’s right.49 This structure for deciding whether speech is 
protected takes into account the interests of both parties.50 It does not 
lightly dismiss teacher creativity and the need to foster debate within 
the classroom in the name of employee discipline and the school 
 
 44. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 
75 (1964)). 
 45. See id. (recognizing the importance of the First Amendment right to comment on 
matters of public concern). 
 46. E.g., Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (“To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court’s 
opinion [suggests] that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First 
Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public 
interest . . . , [that premise] has been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this 
Court.”); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967) (“[T]he 
theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any 
conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.” (citation omitted)); 
Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 406 (4th Cir. 2000) (“It is well settled that citizens do not 
relinquish all of their First Amendment rights by virtue of accepting public employment.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 47. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 48. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (highlighting the distinction between a 
teacher speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern and a teacher speaking as a 
government employee). 
 49. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.  
 50. See Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 801–02 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Our 
decision should not be misconstrued as suggesting that a teacher’s creativity is incompatible 
with the first amendment, nor is it intended to suggest that public school teachers foster free 
debate in their classrooms only at their own risk or that their classrooms must be ‘cast with a 
pall of orthodoxy.’”). 
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administration’s conception of workplace efficiency.51 Nor does the 
test derogate the employer’s interest out of hand in response to any 
claim of First Amendment privilege by a teacher. 
B. Defining Matters of Public Concern 
To prevail under Pickering, plaintiffs must almost invariably 
prove that their speech touches on a matter of public concern and 
that their interests in expression as citizens outweighs the state’s 
interest as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.52 Nonetheless, the 
question of what qualifies as a matter of public concern remains. 
Generally, speech involves a matter of public concern when it relates 
to an issue of “political, social, or other interest to a community.”53 To 
determine whether speech meets that test, courts examine the 
“content, form, and context” of the speech in light of the entire 
record,54 with the content superseding form and context in 
importance.55 Even if a public employee does not communicate in the 
form or context of a public airing, the speech touches on a matter of 
public concern so long as the content relates to a social, political, or 
other community concern.56 While public employees need not make a 
public announcement for the speech to touch upon a matter of public 
concern, they cannot simply remain mute, internalize their concerns 
about censorship, and afterwards contend that their speech was on a 
matter of public concern.57 For example, a public school teacher may 
not remain quiet about what she perceived as unconstitutional 
censorship of her teaching until her employment contract was not 
renewed and still receive protection under Pickering.58 Even though 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1048 (6th Cir. 2001) (giving the 
requirements for a public employee to establish a claim of First Amendment retaliation). 
 53. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 406 (4th 
Cir. 2000). 
 54. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48; Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 406. 
 55. Grice, supra note 10, at 1978. 
 56. See Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1052 (“[E]ven if a public employee were acting out of a private 
motive with no intent to air her speech publicly. . . so long as the speech relates to matters of 
‘political, social, or other concern to the community,’ as opposed to matters ‘only of personal 
interest,’ it shall be considered as touching upon matters of public concern.” (quoting Connick, 
461 U.S. at 146–49)). 
 57. Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 58. Id. at 799–800. 
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context and form are normally not the primary issues, they are 
considered in the analysis. 
Some courts have held that whether the speech in question is 
primarily made in the public employee’s role as a citizen or an 
employee, i.e. the speech’s context or form, is critical to the 
determination of whether the speech concerns a public matter.59 
Other courts have expressly disclaimed this position, contending that 
the speaker’s role is less important than the actual content of the 
speech. In other words, these courts consider whether the content of 
the speech actually involves matters related to the community’s social 
and political concerns, rather than matters of private interest.60 Under 
the latter inquiry, it is possible for speech to be “mixed,” where the 
communication is made not only in the roles of both citizen and 
employee, but also involves matters of both public and private 
concern.61 So long as any part of the speech relates to matters of 
public concern, the court must use the Pickering analysis and its 
associated balancing test.62 
As critics of the Pickering test note, a focus on the employee’s 
role leads to an essentially predetermined outcome for teacher speech 
cases.63 That is, if one contends that anytime an employee is being 
paid to speak he is acting in his role as an employee, the First 
Amendment would afford essentially no protection for teacher 
instructional speech because the very act of teaching is what the 
employee is being paid to do.64 
The guidelines for describing a matter of public concern 
discussed above are beneficial as general rules, but “[t]he definition 
of ‘matters of public concern’ is imprecise,”65 so concrete examples of 
qualifying and nonqualifying speech might be more useful. Examples 
of public employee speech touching upon matters of public concern 
 
 59. E.g., Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 407. 
 60. E.g., Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1052. 
 61. Id. at 1052 n.5. 
 62. Id.; see also Rahn v. Drake Ctr., Inc., 31 F.3d 407, 411 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 63. See id. at 1051 (criticizing the Fourth and Fifth Circuits for deciding that when teachers 
are choosing a curriculum, they are speaking as employees on a private matter, rather than as 
citizens on matters of public concern). 
 64. See id. at 1051–52 (“Thus, when teaching, even if about an upcoming presidential 
election or the importance of our Bill of Rights, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits’ reasoning would 
leave such speech without constitutional protection, for the teacher is speaking as an employee, 
and not as a citizen.”). 
 65. Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 798 (5th Cir. 1989). 
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include: a public school teacher sending a letter to the local 
newspaper critical of the school administration’s past handling of 
proposals to raise new revenue;66 a public school teacher inviting a 
presenter on industrial hemp to her class;67 and a deputy sheriff 
criticizing his superior for possible racial discrimination.68 Illustrations 
of speech not held to be touching a matter of public concern include: 
a district attorney disbursing a questionnaire about workplace morale 
to fellow employees that implied misconduct by her superior;69 a 
public school teacher’s silence about what she perceived as 
unconstitutional censorship of her teaching until her employment 
contract was not renewed;70 and professors accessing sexually explicit 
materials on state computers.71 Perhaps the difference between the 
courts’ decisions is that speech held as touching upon matters of 
public concern addresses macro, community-wide issues like school 
funding, substance legalization, and racism. On the other hand, 
unprotected speech relates to more private concerns like intraoffice 
politics. 
C. The Balancing Test 
Once a court has answered the threshold question of whether the 
speech in question touches upon a matter of public concern, it 
balances the interest of the employee in commenting on such matters 
against the interest of the state employer in delivering efficient public 
services.72 Thus, a public school that retaliates against a teacher 
engaging in speech involving a public concern does not automatically 
violate the First Amendment.73 In administering the balancing test, 
courts “‘consider whether an employee’s comments meaningfully 
 
 66. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571 (1968). 
 67. Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1051. 
 68. Victor v. McElveen, 150 F.3d 451, 455–56 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 69. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983). 
 70. Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 799–800. 
 71. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 409 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 72. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568–69 (1968) (“The problem in any case is 
to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”); Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 
944 F.2d 773, 777 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Pickering established a test that first asks whether a public 
employee’s expression addresses a matter of public concern and then balances that employee’s 
interest in making the statement with the interests of the government in ‘promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs.’” (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 563).  
 73. Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 799. 
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interfere with the performance of her duties, undermine a legitimate 
goal or mission of the employer, create disharmony among co-
workers, impair discipline by superiors, or destroy the relationship of 
loyalty and trust required of confidential employees.’”74 
Many of the considerations embedded in the balancing test are 
the same, or at least tangential to, the analysis of whether speech is 
related to a matter of public concern in the first place. The factors in 
the balancing test turn on whether the court defines the speech as 
commenting on matters of public concern. Taking an example from 
above, if a court decides that the speech of a public school teacher in 
writing a letter to the local newspaper criticizing the administration 
about school funding implicates a matter of public concern (funding 
of schools) instead of the private concern of intraoffice squabbling, it 
is unlikely to find that it “meaningfully interferes with the 
performance of her duties, undermines a legitimate goal or mission by 
the employer”. Likewise, in holding that professors’ criticism of a 
state policy on internet access implicates a purely private interest, the 
court may be focusing on the speech’s “meaningful[] interfer[ence]” 
with the performance of the professors’ duties. How a court 
characterizes speech as either a matter of public or private concern 
likely goes a long way toward determining whether the interests of 
the employer or employee outweigh the other. In essence, the 
threshold and balancing tests are not clearly distinct from one 
another. 
Although speech that involves matters of public concern rarely 
causes any of the work interferences triggering the balance of 
interests to shift in the employer’s favor, it sometimes might. For 
example, the balancing test would deny protection to speech in 
situations where “the need for confidentiality between the 
governmental employer and employee is so great, or the relationship 
is so personal and intimate in nature, that public criticism of the 
employer may furnish grounds for dismissal without violating the first 
amendment.”75 Thus, the government is justified in restricting 
intelligence officers from publicly speaking about antiterrorism 
operations because of the absolute necessity for confidentiality. A 
school’s interest will rarely outweigh a teacher’s in the educational 
 
 74. Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1053 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Williams v. Kentucky, 24 F.3d 1526, 1536 (6th Cir. 1994)). 
 75. Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 799 (discussing Pickering’s recognition of the need to balance 
competing interests).  
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context though, because as Justice White writes in his separate 
opinion in Pickering: 
The State may not fire the teacher for making [innocently or 
negligently false statements involving a matter of public concern] 
unless, as I gather it, there are special circumstances, not present in 
this case, demonstrating an overriding state interest, such as the 
need for confidentiality or the special obligations which a teacher in 
a particular position may owe to his superiors.76 
Justice White also dissented in part to protest the majority’s 
refusal to decide whether a knowingly or recklessly false statement 
that touches upon a matter of public concern is protected under the 
First Amendment if the statement had none of the “harmful effects” 
of interfering with the operation of the school or the individual 
teacher’s duties.77 The majority had stated that because the statements 
in Pickering were not knowingly or recklessly false, they could not 
decide that question.78 Justice White contended that “deliberate or 
reckless falsehoods” deserve no protection under the First 
Amendment regardless of whether there were any harmful 
consequences therefrom.79 Again, the issue of how a court defines 
speech as relating to a matter of public concern rears its head. If a 
statement is knowingly or recklessly false, it likely will not be found 
to legitimately comment on a matter of public concern, thus 
precluding First Amendment protection. However, if a court does 
find it to be touching on a matter of public concern, the court will 
probably have already decided that there was little harm incurred 
from the statement, hijacking the balancing test in favor of protection. 
D. Criticism of the Pickering Test 
The most important criticism of applying Pickering to 
instructional speech cases is that the facts of the case do not exactly 
correspond to teacher speech within the classroom.80 As a result, the 
case is an inappropriate starting point from which to analyze the 
 
 76. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 582 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 77. Id. at 583. 
 78. Id. at 575 n.6 (majority opinion) (“Because. . .appellant’s statements were not 
knowingly or recklessly false, we have no occasion to [examine] whether a statement that was 
knowingly or recklessly false would, if it were neither shown nor could reasonably be presumed 
to have had any harmful effects, still be protected by the First Amendment.”). 
 79. Id. at 583–84 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 80. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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constitutional protection of instructional speech.81 Pickering provides 
protection for a teacher’s political expression in public, but does not 
directly deal with in-class speech or the right of students to hear 
diverse viewpoints in the classroom.82 Because Pickering involved 
speech outside the classroom, its test fails to account for the 
importance of social value education and exposure to diverse 
opinions. 
Second, the constitutionality of classroom speech regulations 
should not hinge upon the public or private nature of the speech 
because, whether public or private, teachers’ speech gives students 
ideas that may be part of the public debate and educates students 
about the process of rational discourse.83 Thus, while a teacher’s 
speech may not touch on a matter of public concern, it still has a 
significant effect on society by instructing students on the process of 
public debate and exposing students to ideas they might encounter 
therein.84 This criticism returns to the idea that the Pickering test does 
not reflect the goal of exposing students to diverse ideas. A test 
primarily concerned with the subject matter of the speech cannot 
account for the message’s inherent positive value, regardless of the 
content. 
III.  THE HAZELWOOD TEST 
A. The Evolution of Hazelwood 
Lower courts have used the test enunciated in the 1988 case 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.85 In that case, the student 
staff of a high school newspaper claimed First Amendment 
infringement for administration censorship of their articles.86 The 
Court found that the administration could restrict the students’ 
speech so long as the actions of the educators were “reasonably 
related to a legitimate pedagogical concern.”87 Thus, for the 
 
 81. Clarick, supra note 14, at 701. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. at 702 (offering that instead, “the extent of permissible regulation of a teacher’s 
speech” should be determined by “the special concerns accompanying a teacher’s in-class 
speech”). 
 84. Id. 
 85. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 86. Id. at 260. 
 87. Id. at 273. 
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restriction to be valid, the school’s pedagogical interests must be 
identified and evaluated as to their legitimacy, and the school’s 
actions must reasonably relate to the pedagogical interests it has 
identified.88 Unlike in Pickering, the Court in Hazelwood decided that 
there was no violation of First Amendment rights because the 
regulation of speech was valid as a protection of the school’s 
pedagogical interests.89 
The First, Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have 
adopted the Hazelwood test to decide instructional speech cases.90 In 
these circuits, schools can regulate in-class teacher speech for reasons 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.91 Hazelwood 
addressed student speech in a high school newspaper, rather than in-
class teacher speech.92 Hazelwood was first transposed from student 
speech cases to elementary school teacher speech cases in the Tenth 
Circuit.93 There, the court cited the case to support the holding that, in 
general, if in-school speech is “part of the school curriculum or 
school-sponsored activities,” it is subject to greater restriction than 
personal expression such as the protest armbands in Tinker.94 The first 
instance of Hazelwood being used in a higher education case was in 
the Eleventh Circuit.95 The court extended the Tenth Circuit’s earlier 
 
 88. Grice, supra note 10, at 1986. 
 89. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260–61. 
 90. Young, supra note 36, at B6. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 260 (1988). 
 93. See Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1059 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding the action of 
school authorities forbidding a fifth grade teacher from keeping two religious books in his 
classroom library and reading from the Bible during the class silent reading period). 
 94. In distinguishing between in-class and out of class speech, the Roberts court held: 
We find no reason here to draw a distinction between teachers and students where 
classroom expression is concerned. Thus, if the speech involved is not fairly 
considered part of the school curriculum or school-sponsored activities, then it may 
only be regulated if it would ‘materially and substantially interfere with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.’ If, on the other 
hand, the conduct endorses a particular religion and is an activity ‘that students, 
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur 
of the school,’ creating the requisite state action, then the activity infringes on the 
rights of others and must be prohibited. (citations omitted). 
Roberts, 921 F.2d at 1057; see also E. Edmund Reutter Jr., Academic Freedom Advisory: Be 
Wary of the Long Arm of Kuhlmeier, 89 Educ. L. Rep. (West Publ’g Co.) 347, 348–49 (May 
1994) (discussing the Tenth Circuit’s application of Hazelwood to elementary school teacher 
speech). 
 95. See Bishop v. Aranov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1078 (11th Cir. 1991) (disallowing a university 
professor from holding “optional” classes to espouse his religious views because terming the 
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ruling by deciding that while student expression can be more easily 
separated as independent from the school, teacher speech is more 
likely to be taken as “directly and deliberately representative of the 
school.”96 
The Tenth Circuit took another step towards blurring the line 
between student and teacher speech when it first used Hazelwood in 
a high school instructional speech case,97 despite the fact that the 
parties agreed, both before the district court and on appeal, that the 
issue was controlled by Pickering.98 There, the court justified using the 
pedagogical concerns test because the state had distinctive 
responsibilities as an educator, contending that while Pickering 
protected the interests of the state as an employer, it did not 
sufficiently recognize its interests as an educator.99 The court also held 
that there was no reason to distinguish between in-class student and 
teacher speech for the purposes of deciding whether it was protected 
by the First Amendment.100 It stated that the school’s interests in 
regulating classroom speech—for example ensuring that students 
learned whatever lessons a particular exercise were designed to teach 
without being exposed to materials unsuitable for their maturity 
level—were implicated by both student and teacher expression.101 
From the initial judicial leap that speech involving curricular concerns 
is subject to greater school restrictions than ordinary classroom 
speech, to the total amalgamation of student and teacher speech, 
Hazelwood has steadily evolved as a standard for deciding 
instructional speech cases. 
B. The Impact of Hazelwood 
Hazelwood marked a tipping point in the way the courts viewed 
First Amendment instructional speech cases. Prior to Hazelwood, 
when the Pickering test dominated, the vast majority of teachers 
 
meetings so gave the illusion of official sanction, which might have unduly pressured students 
into attending and adopting his beliefs). 
 96. Id. at 1073; see also Reutter, supra note 94, at 349 (observing that the Eleventh Circuit 
characterized Roberts as founded on Hazelwood). 
 97. See Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 774 (10th Cir. 1991) (affirming summary 
judgment against a First Amendment claim by a high school teacher who was disciplined for 
comments made in class). 
 98. Reutter, supra note 94, at 350–51. 
 99. Id. at 351. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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alleging violations of their First Amendment rights prevailed in the 
courts.102 Most pre-Hazelwood cases emphasized teachers’ 
professional judgment and their right to academic freedom in the 
classroom, rather than the right of the school as an employer to 
regulate the speech of its employees.103 The cases generally turned on 
the school’s lack of notice to the teacher of the speech restriction—
school officials having no policy prohibiting the teacher’s conduct, 
acting after the fact, and then being displeased with a particular 
assignment or discussion.104 In cases where the teacher’s First 
Amendment claims were rejected, the administration generally had a 
separate valid ground for supporting their action.105 Since the 
Hazelwood decision, though, only a few courts have applied the 
Pickering test to in-class speech cases,106 with most courts opting for 
the test established in the more recent Supreme Court decision. 
C. The Importance of Notice 
Notice is essential to instructional speech cases, like all First 
Amendment speech regulation cases, because for a restriction of 
otherwise free speech to be allowed, the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires notice that the conduct or speech at 
issue is prohibited.107 In order to avoid unconstitutionality on 
vagueness grounds, such notice must be in a form that would allow an 
 
 102. Grice, supra note 10, at 1989. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1989–99; see Cary v. Bd. of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 541 (10th Cir. 1979) (Doyle, J., 
concurring) (finding lack of notice to be a decisive factor in suits that teachers won prior to 
1979). 
 105. See Cary, 598 F.2d at 542 (Doyle, J., concurring) (citing Adams v. Campbell County 
Sch. Dist., 511 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1975; Brubaker v. Bd. of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974); 
Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972). 
 106. See Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1187–88 (6th Cir. 1995) (applying the 
Pickering public concerns test to a university basketball coach’s locker room speech employing 
racial slurs); Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1012 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying the Pickering test to a 
law school professor’s speech advocating legalization of marijuana and criticizing national drug 
policy); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying the 
Pickering test to a high school teacher’s supplementary reading list); Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 
F. Supp. 999, 1011 (W.D. Va. 1996) (applying the Pickering test to the speech of a university 
professor because “the ‘significant interests’ discussed in Hazelwood that justify the 
restriction . . . of teachers’ in-class speech, are not implicated to the same extent, if at all, in the 
context of higher education”), aff’d per curiam 106 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table 
decision). 
 107. See, e.g., Dean v. Timpson Indep. Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 302, 309 (E.D. Tex. 1979) 
(holding that a school district violated the due process rights of a public school teacher by firing 
her without notice that her conduct was forbidden). 
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average person to understand what conduct is prohibited.108 Because 
proscription of teacher speech without prior notice could cause 
educators to internally censor their speech out of fear, thus defeating 
the goal of exposing students to a variety of ideas, courts stringently 
apply the vagueness doctrine in instructional speech cases.109 While a 
school must be clear in its notice to teachers of prohibited material, it 
need not detail exactly what is offensive about the restricted speech110 
or expressly prohibit every imaginable inappropriate conduct.111 
Indeed, courts have directly rejected the notion that school 
administrations should try to proscribe all conceivable offending 
behaviors because it would be impossible to do so.112 
In one post-Hazelwood decision, a federal court went so far as to 
separate the universe of instructional speech cases into two groups—
those where the teacher’s action violates the administration’s 
predetermined curriculum content rules (notice given), and those 
where the teacher is disciplined for his expression despite the fact that 
it violated no specific administrative rule (no notice).113 The court held 
that if notice was given, the teacher had no redress because the 
school’s decision to censor that content was within its right to control 
the curriculum.114 The disciplinary action taken by the school was not 
in response to the teacher’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, 
 
 108. See id. at 305 (finding that a teacher was not given sufficient notice because “either [the 
teacher] was never issued a warning . . . or the warning was of an ambiguous or vague nature, 
such that a reasonably prudent person could not discern what conduct the warning sought to 
prevent”). 
 109. See id. at 309 (“Governmental regulation of First Amendment activities has 
traditionally been required to be precise. An offhand comment to [the teacher], the meaning of 
which was likely to be vague or ambiguous, cannot pass Constitutional muster . . . .” (citation 
omitted)). 
 110. See Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1542 (7th Cir. 
1996) (“[W]e reject [plaintiff’s] implication that a school must spell out in intricate detail 
precisely what is ‘libelous or obscene language’. . . or which materials ‘will greatly disrupt or 
materially interfere with school procedures and intrude into school affairs or the lives of 
others.’” (quoting RACINE UNIFIED SCH. DIST., CODE OF STUDENT RESPONSIBILITIES AND 
RIGHTS § 6144.11 (1994–1995))). 
 111. Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 454 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[W]e do not hold that a school must 
expressly prohibit every imaginable inappropriate conduct by teachers.”). 
 112. Id.; Krizek v. Bd. of Educ., 713 F. Supp. 1131, 1140 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
 113. Krizek, 713 F. Supp. at 1137–38 (noting that the “two types of cases involving teachers’ 
expression in the classroom” are “cases involving curriculum content rules promulgated by the 
school administration and challenged by teachers” and “cases where a teacher is disciplined for 
expression in the classroom, despite the fact that the expression in question violated no specific 
rule”). 
 114. Id. at 1139. 
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but rather to his flaunting a legitimate administrative rule.115 If, on the 
other hand, the teacher had notice, the court must decide whether 
regulation of the speech after the fact was reasonably related to a 
legitimate pedagogical concern.116 Although few cases turn so strongly 
on the presence of notice alone, it is an important factor throughout 
the case law. 
D. The Rationale for Using the Hazelwood Test 
Courts justify using the Hazelwood test to decide instructional 
speech cases instead of Pickering because it appears to better 
recognize the interests of the state as an educator, rather than as an 
employer.117 They contend that First Amendment speech cases in a 
school environment deserve a different standard than the Pickering 
test because, while the public concerns test may work in more general 
settings, the right of a public employee to participate as a citizen in 
the public debate is “less forceful” in the public school context.118 
Thus, the judgment of school administrators merits more deference in 
regulating the in-class speech of teachers than Pickering provides.119 
Other courts have extended Hazelwood’s deference to regulation 
into the teacher speech context by focusing on the state’s interests in 
ensuring that students learn their intended lessons without being 
exposed to material inappropriate for their maturity level, and that 
the views of the speaker are not erroneously attributed to the 
school.120 Further, the school’s interest in “preventing interference 
with the day-to-day operations of its classrooms” gives the 
administration reign to establish the focus and boundaries of the 
general subject matter of the curriculum.121 In short, courts apply the 
Hazelwood test rather than Pickering because it appears better 
tailored to the school environment. As a result, courts place more 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. at 1142–43 (adopting the Hazelwood test in a case of speech regulation without 
prior notice). 
 117. E.g., Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 777 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. (“Because of the special characteristics of a classroom environment, in applying 
Hazelwood instead of Pickering we distinguish between teachers’ classroom expression and 
teachers’ expression in other situations that would not reasonably be perceived as school-
sponsored.”). 
 120. E.g., Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 121. Bishop v. Aranov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1073 (11th Cir. 1991). 
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emphasis on the role of teacher speech regulation in creating a 
conducive educational setting. 
E. The Classroom is not a Public Forum 
The Supreme Court has recognized that regardless of the public 
employer’s interest in regulating the speech of its employees, schools 
cannot restrict speech in public fora based on the message’s 
viewpoint.122 In fact, “[i]t is axiomatic that the government may not 
regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it 
conveys.”123 Once a school creates a public forum, it cannot 
discriminate against speech made in the forum because of its 
message.124 Even if the forum is limited to the purposes for which it 
was created, a school cannot exercise viewpoint discrimination.125 
However, a school can exclude speech in a limited forum it created to 
preserve the limits of the forum, but only on the basis of subject 
matter rather than viewpoint.126 Under either Pickering or 
Hazelwood, the analysis turns first on the threshold issue of whether 
the classroom is a public forum where viewpoint discrimination is 
forbidden. 
Under Hazelwood, in the absence of a public forum a school may 
limit speech in a school-sponsored activity so long as the limitation 
reasonably relates to legitimate pedagogical concerns.127 On the other 
hand, if the classroom constitutes a public forum, the school cannot 
exercise viewpoint discrimination.128 The Court in Hazelwood 
addressed this question.129 It observed that public schools do not 
possess “all of the attributes of streets, parks, and other traditional 
public forums that, ‘time out of mind, have been used for purposes of 
 
 122. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) 
(stating that the state cannot “exercise viewpoint discrimination, even when the limited public 
forum is one of its own creation”). 
 123. Id. at 828. 
 124. Id. at 829. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 829–30 (“[W]e have observed a distinction between, on the one hand, content 
discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum, and, 
on the other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed 
against speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.”). 
 127. Henerey ex rel Henerey v. City of St. Charles, Sch. Dist., 200 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 
1999). 
 128. See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text. 
 129. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (observing that public 
schools are generally not forums for public expression). 
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assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing 
public questions.’”130 Schools can only be deemed public fora if the 
administration has “‘by policy or by practice’” opened the facility “for 
indiscriminate use by the general public.”131 A school cannot “‘create 
a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but 
only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public 
discourse.’”132 
Although the Hazelwood Court did not specifically address 
whether classrooms are public fora because of the factual limitations 
of the case, its discussions of public school facilities in general have 
led other courts to decide that classrooms do not qualify.133 One court 
held that elementary school classrooms are not public fora because 
while the verbal marketplace of ideas may be important for high 
schools to expose students to various viewpoints, it is inappropriate 
for the “delicate custodial and tutelary environment of an elementary 
school.”134 This suggests that a spectrum of public fora may exist 
where elementary schools can restrict the speech of teachers more 
than high schools, and high schools may in turn impose greater 
controls than colleges. This theory, however, is not borne out in the 
case law, as classrooms, whether in elementary schools or universities, 
have generally been held not to be public fora.135 Classrooms do not 
 
 130. Id. (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). 
 131. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)). 
 132. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 
(1985)). 
 133. For example, in Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004), the Tenth 
Circuit explained: 
Nothing in the record leads us to conclude that . . . [the school’s] classroom could 
reasonably be considered a traditional public forum. Neither could the classroom be 
considered a designated public forum, as there is no indication in the record that 
“school authorities have ‘by policy or by practice’ opened [the classroom] ‘for 
indiscriminate use by the general public,’ or by some segment of the public, such as 
student organizations.” 
Id. at 1285 (second alteration in original) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267); see also 
Henerey ex rel Henerey v. City of St. Charles, Sch. Dist., 200 F.3d 1128, 1133 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(concluding that a public school election was not a public forum when the school district did not 
by policy or practice open campaigns to the public); Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson 
Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1529–40 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding the district court’s conclusion 
that an elementary school was not a public forum); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 
1993) (finding that a ninth grade biology classroom was not a public forum); Bishop v. Aronov, 
926 F.2d 1066, 1071 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that a public university’s classroom was not a 
public forum). 
 134. Muller, 89 F.3d at 1539. 
 135. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
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meet Hazelwood’s description of public fora as facilities or locations 
used by the general public for assembly and public debate.136 Thus, 
teacher in-class speech generally falls outside the public forum 
prohibition against viewpoint discrimination. Though the circuits 
have split on whether the Hazelwood test itself allows viewpoint 
discrimination in the public school setting,137 such regulation is 
generally not precluded in teacher instructional speech cases because 
the classroom does not qualify as a public forum. 
F. Defining Pedagogical Concerns 
When deciding if speech restrictions implicate legitimate 
pedagogical concerns, courts begin with the school’s interest in 
regulating curriculum-related speech.138 Educational institutions can 
exercise more control over curricular speech than over speech 
relating to extracurricular activities because curricular speech is likely 
to be identified with the administration and “bear a school’s 
‘imprimatur.’”139 One court, however, has held that pedagogical 
concerns are not limited to the academic.140 That is, in recognizing the 
goal of public schools to inculcate social values, the state may regulate 
employee speech involving traditional moral, social, and political 
norms, like civility.141 
At least one court has eschewed bright-line rules, suggesting that 
the level of pedagogical concern should be decided on a case by case 
basis, depending on the age and sophistication of the students, the 
relationship between the teaching method and a valid educational 
 
 136. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 137. Susannah Barton Tobin, Note, Divining Hazelwood: The Need for a Viewpoint 
Neutrality Requirement in School Speech Cases, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 217, 231 (2004) 
(“Currently, the First, Third, and Tenth Circuits have stated that viewpoint discrimination is 
permissible, despite the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence to the contrary 
outside the context of schools. At the same time, the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have 
indicated that viewpoint discrimination is not permissible.”). 
 138. See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1286 (defining school-sponsored speech as “‘expressive 
activities’ that ‘may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum’” (quoting 
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271)). 
 139. Id. at 1289. 
 140. E.g., Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 1989) (“The universe of legitimate 
pedagogical concerns is by no means confined to the academic . . . .”). 
 141. Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1540 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(“‘[P]edagogical concerns’ include not only the structured transmission of a body of knowledge 
in an orderly environment, but also the inculcation of civility (including manners) and 
traditional moral, social, and political norms.”). 
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objective, and the context and manner of presentation.142 These 
factors again point to an increasing spectrum of regulation where the 
less sophisticated the students and the more the speech relates to an 
educational objective, the greater the chance of constitutional 
regulation. By adopting these factors and articulating the need for 
notice of speech regulation, the First Circuit tempered the 
considerable deference that courts using the pedagogical concerns 
test give school administrations in regulating teacher speech since 
Hazelwood.143 
At least one court, the Fourth Circuit in Boring v. Buncombe 
County Board of Education,144 has held that the definition of 
pedagogical is “educational,” thus encompasses any speech relating to 
the curriculum.145 As a result, schools in the Fourth Circuit may 
regulate teacher speech without establishing the legitimacy of the 
pedagogical concerns ostensibly behind the censorship.146 The court 
cited public policy reasons for entrusting all curricular decisions to the 
school administration while completely denying any free speech right 
to the faculty.147 This is the ultimate in deference to school 
administration—because any speech-regulating decision by the state 
is by definition pedagogical, the state has an unlimited opportunity to 
censor teacher speech without even offering evidence that the 
restriction does, in fact, relate to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 
The dissent in Boring argued that, while the administration has 
final control over the school’s curriculum, that the limited First 
Amendment protection allowed for teacher in-class speech should 
fetter that authority.148 “By holding that public school administrators 
can constitutionally discipline a teacher for in-class speech without 
demonstrating, or even articulating, some legitimate pedagogical 
concern related to that discipline, the majority extinguishes First 
 
 142. Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 143. See Reutter, supra note 94, at 354 (observing that “[t]hose who cherish responsible 
academic freedom as a necessity for the future of the country can be somewhat encouraged by 
the First Circuit’s discussion.”). 
 144. 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 145. Id. at 370. 
 146. Id. at 376 (Motz, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id. at 371 (majority opinion) (“[I]t is far better public policy, absent a valid statutory 
directive . . . , that the makeup of the curriculum be entrusted to the local school authorities . . . , 
rather than to the teachers, who would be responsible only to the judges, had they a First 
Amendment right to participate in the makeup of the curriculum.”). 
 148. Id. at 375 (Motz, J., dissenting). 
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Amendment rights in [public schools] where the Supreme Court has 
directed they should be brought ‘vividly into operation.’”149 One critic 
criticized the Fourth Circuit’s decision because it implies that public 
school teachers have absolutely no First Amendment rights to control 
curriculum.150 That commentator argued that both the teacher and 
school have constitutionally protected interests in the developing 
curriculum, and that the Fourth Circuit’s approach destroyed any 
professional balance existing between employer and employee.151 
While recognizing the relationship between curriculum and 
pedagogical concerns, other courts have required the state to 
demonstrate that the administration’s action in regulating the teacher 
speech relates to a legitimate pedagogical concern.152 The Supreme 
Court appears to have endorsed this approach in Hazelwood, by 
recognizing that a particular curricular decision may have “no valid 
educational purpose” and that in such a case, the First Amendment 
rights of the speaker are directly implicated.153 The Eleventh Circuit 
recognized that curricular programs, by definition, have pedagogical 
purposes, but refrained from stating that every curricular decision 
constitutes a legitimate pedagogical concern.154 In fact, it expressly 
rejected the Fourth Circuit’s determination that the court must defer 
to the administration’s decision and thus assume that the state’s 
action relates to a legitimate pedagogical concern.155 Indeed, the 
Fourth Circuit’s acceptance of that argument is extreme because it 
defines pedagogical concerns in a way that virtually ensures the 
constitutionality of teacher speech regulation by the state. 
G. Criticism of Hazelwood 
The Hazelwood dissent argued that allowing the state to restrict 
student speech whenever the censorship is reasonably related to a 
legitimate pedagogical concern could convert public schools into 
“enclaves of totalitarianism that strangle the free mind at its 
 
 149. Id. at 380. 
 150. E.g., Grice, supra note 10, at 1970. 
 151. Id. at 2005. 
 152. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Boring, 136 F.3d at 377 
(Motz, J., dissenting).  
 153. 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
 154. Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1322. 
 155. Id. (Motz, J., dissenting) (citing Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1321). 
04__KUHN.DOC 10/4/2006 1:10 PM 
1020 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:995 
source.”156 The same holds true when applying Hazelwood to teacher 
speech cases. The broader the definition of pedagogical concerns, the 
less authority teachers have to develop their own teaching material, 
and the greater the chance of anxiety-driven self-censorship.157 Public 
schools’ goal of exposing students to a diverse set of viewpoints and 
ideas is at risk under holdings like the Fourth Circuit’s, where the 
administration has total control over curricular decisions and the 
courts provide no oversight to ensure that the actions of the state 
actually further legitimate pedagogical concerns. Not only do the 
teachers lose in the form of less freedom to speak and control 
curriculum decisions, but the students suffer in terms of exposure to 
ideas and intellectual development. 
The very application of the Hazelwood standard to instructional 
speech cases comes under fire from commentators who find it “as 
ominous as it is questionable” that the test providing for greater 
administrative control in teacher speech cases “was developed in the 
context of student speech in supervised learning settings.”158 Indeed, 
the first court to apply the Hazelwood standard to teachers engaged 
in only the most cursory analysis, and failed to cite any First 
Amendment precedent involving teachers.159 Creating a new standard 
out of a case with dissimilar facts should be done with careful 
explanation and thoughtful analysis of the connections between the 
different contexts, but instead, the predominant test for deciding 
instructional speech cases was tailored in response to student speech 
concerns and applied to teachers with little regard for the 
consequences. 
IV.  PROPOSAL: A HYBRID TEST 
Given the problems inherent in using the Pickering and 
Hazelwood tests to decide instructional speech cases, the public 
would be better served by a reformulated test where restrictions on 
content are held to a higher standard than restrictions on process. The 
possible outcomes of this hybrid system can be examined through the 
lens of the current Pickering and Hazelwood tests. Applying the 
 
 156. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 280 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation and internal quotations 
omitted). 
 157. Reutter, supra note 94, at 354. 
 158. Id. at 353. 
 159. Id. 
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Pickering public concerns test to content restrictions and the 
Hazelwood pedagogical concerns test to process restrictions would 
yield a system with greater educational diversity than using the 
Hazelwood test for both types of restrictions. 
This hybrid system would allow teachers to expose students to 
matters of public concern while simultaneously permitting schools to 
retain control over instructional methods. While permitting greater 
educational diversity, the hybrid test would protect the state interests 
in ensuring that students learn the lessons intended and are not 
exposed to material inappropriate for their maturity level, and that 
the views of others are not erroneously attributed to the school. 
Schools could still restrict the substantive content of instruction 
through the Pickering balancing test if the interest of the state in 
promoting efficient public services through its employees outweighs 
the interests of the teacher in speaking. schools, however, would have 
substantially less control over the content of instructional speech than 
if the Hazelwood test applied alone. 
Applying the hybrid test to the Boring factual situation—where a 
teacher was restricted from using a play about a dysfunctional family 
because of the school’s obscenity concerns—the school could restrict 
the process of using the play as a teaching method under the 
Hazelwood standard, but could not restrict the teacher from 
approaching the subject matter of poverty and mental illness. If, 
however, the teacher were using the play to instruct students on a 
particular type of theatrical drama, for example, rather than to discuss 
poverty and mental illness, the school could restrict both process and 
content, as the content would not rise to the level of a matter of 
public concern. 
The hybrid test would render a different outcome when applied 
to the facts in Cockrel, where the court had held that, under the 
Pickering test, the First Amendment protected a teacher who invited 
Woody Harrelson to present to her class on industrial hemp. Because 
the subject of industrial hemp rises to the level of a matter of public 
concern, under the hybrid test the school could not restrict Cockrel 
from speaking instructionally on the subject. The school, however, 
could restrict the process by which Cockrel approached the subject if 
the restriction was reasonably related to a pedagogical concern. For 
example, the school could restrict the process of Cockrel inviting 
Woody Harrelson to class because of concerns that the visit would 
cause instructional distractions or security problems. Thus, Cockrel 
could educate her class on industrial hemp as a matter of public 
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interest, but would have to employ a method that satisfied the 
school’s legitimate pedagogical concerns. 
The relatively recent question of how public school teachers 
should approach the first anniversary of the September 11 attacks 
provides yet another example of how the hybrid test would be 
applied. Around the first anniversary of September 11, the National 
Education Association (NEA) and affiliates of the American 
Federation of Teachers argued publicly over the best way to teach 
about the attacks.160 The NEA suggested lesson plans that did not 
assign blame for the attacks and recommended that teachers discuss 
them in the context of “historical instances of American 
intolerance.”161 The New York and West Virginia affiliates of the 
American Federation of Teachers, among others, argued that the 
lessons should deal directly with the facts of the attacks and not 
“avoid explicit judgment about the aims and character of the 
terrorists.”162 
Many public school teachers used the NEA lesson plans to teach 
about September 11 in the context of historical examples such as the 
internment of Japanese-Americans after Pearl Harbor. The hybrid 
test would not allow a school district to prohibit a high school teacher 
from analogizing September 11 and the Japanese-American 
internment because they are certainly matters of public concern 
under Pickering. The school district, however, would be allowed to 
proscribe a teaching method that implicitly or explicitly placed sole 
blame on the American government for the 9/11 attacks by 
characterizing U.S. intolerance as the lone precipitating factor. The 
state’s pedagogical concern in preventing its employees from teaching 
opinion as fact would be implicated by such an educational approach, 
so it would be justified in applying a process restriction. If a high 
school teacher introduced students to a balanced group of theories of 
September 11 causation, of which American intolerance was one, and 
identified the theories as such, the state would have a weaker 
argument for a pedagogical concern justifying a process restriction.  
In contrast, if an elementary school teacher attempted to use the 
same balanced causation theory lesson plan to teach about the 
attacks, the school would be more justified in a process restriction 
 
 160. See Ellen Sorokin, More Teachers Shun NEA’s 9/11 Lessons, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 24, 
2002, at A01 (discussing the disagreement over the NEA’s proposed lesson plans). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
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because of its pedagogical concern in protecting students from 
material inappropriate for their age. Under the hybrid test, the 
constitutionality of process restrictions would depend largely on the 
context of the speech that would be proscribed. Courts would have to 
carefully balance whether the speech would implicate legitimate 
pedagogical concerns of the state, just as they must with both content 
and process restrictions now analyzed under Hazelwood. 
True, such a hybrid formulation would face the difficulty of 
differentiating between process and content. Using the Boring 
example again, a court would have to determine as a threshold matter 
whether the play’s content itself is the substance of the instruction, or 
if the play’s content is being used as a process to teach something else. 
In reality, the play could be used for both its procedural and content 
effects, making the hybrid test difficult to administer. Yet the current 
tests are also difficult to administer and are not as well tailored to 
dealing with the rigors of teacher speech cases. 
Critics might also contend that because content and process are 
inseparably intertwined, the Pickering prong would place no practical 
limits on speech restrictions because they could still restrict process 
under Hazelwood. Yet the hybrid test would give courts the flexibility 
to provide some measure of protection to teachers approaching 
matters of public concern in the classroom, in contrast to using the 
more rigid Hazelwood pedagogical concerns test exclusively. 
Without Supreme Court guidance on the issue, the circuits will 
continue to struggle over which test best decides instruction speech 
cases. Both the Pickering and Hazelwood tests suffer from the fact 
that they were not created with teacher speech cases in mind, and 
have been applied, or misapplied as the case may be, in an effort by 
the judiciary to do the best with what it has. Using either of these 
tests to decide instructional speech cases is like trying to fit a square 
peg in a round hole. 
On one hand, the Pickering test protects the interests of citizens 
to participate in the public debate by commenting on matters of 
public concern, but only to the extent that this interest outweighs the 
state’s interest as an employer in restricting that speech. Of course, as 
has been raised here, the question remains of whether the interest 
balancing test is largely conclusory, for the same factors that define 
speech as involving a matter of public concern suggest that the 
teacher’s interests in speaking outweigh the state’s interests in 
regulation. As commentators point out, the Pickering test may ignore 
the goal of exposing students to various ideas by allowing regulation 
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based on the content of the speech—whether it touches upon a 
matter of public concern—instead of recognizing the inherent value 
of all teacher speech in exposing students to ideas and educating them 
about the process of rational debate. 
CONCLUSION 
Teacher speech restrictions raise provocative questions about the 
educational process and its role in society. Most importantly, to what 
extent do we value exposing public school students to diverse ideas in 
order to further their intellectual development? Do we trust our 
teachers to make the curricular decisions necessary to achieve this 
goal? As the pendulum shifts from Pickering to Hazelwood, more 
teacher speech is subject to regulation, and the public schools’ goal of 
inculcating values begins to outweigh the goal of exposure to diverse 
ideas. If society truly benefits from a more uniform educational 
curriculum, where state conceptions of appropriate lessons trump a 
broader teacher-led learning experience, the broad application of 
Hazelwood accomplishes that goal. If, however, schools should be a 
more diverse marketplace of ideas where teachers help students gain 
critical thinking skills in order to prepare them to make independent 
judgments as adults, the system may be approaching failure in that 
endeavor. The problem of regulating instructional teacher speech 
requires finding the balance between an educational system that is 
primarily concerned with teaching the idea of democracy and an 
educational system that aspires to be a democracy of ideas. 
